Situation V: Neutral Port as Refuge to Escape Capture by unknown
International Law Studies – Volume 4 
International Law Situations with Solutions and Notes 





















The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. 
government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.  
SITUATIO~ ''{. 
vVhile ,var exists betw·een the United States and State 
X a ntunber of the "~ar vessels of State X are pursued 
by a United States fleet and seek refuge in a port of 
State Y, a. neutral. The con1mander of the United 
States fleet, after 'vaiting outside the port tor t'venty-
four hours, protests to the authorities of State Y, claim-
ing that as the vessels of the enemy have entered the 
neutral port to escape his fleet they rnay not justly be 
sheltered longer. 
(a) Is the position taken by the United States com-
mander correct? 
(b) \Y.hat should the authorities of State Y do? 
SOLUTION". 
'(a) The United States co1nn1ander 'vould be justified 
in requesting that belligerent vessels entering and 
re1naining in the neutral port solely in order to escape 
capture by his fleet be interned for the remaining period 
of the wrar. 
(b) The authorities of State Y "~ould be acting in 
accord 'vith the best opinion in granting his request. 
XOTES OX SITGATIO:N V. 
The twenty-four hour r·ule.-(a) The con1n1ander of 
the United States fleet 'vaits t'venty-four hours before 
entering his protest, probably on the ground that a 
belligerent 'var vessel is usually allo,ved t"Tenty-four 
hours sojourn in a neutral port. 
Upon this practice, ho,\rever, there is considerable 
difference of opinion, so1ne '\Titers considering it to 
have the force of la,v, others regarding it as in effect only 
'vhen so proclaimed. 
Text writers' opinions.-Risley, discussing sojourn of a 
belligerent ship in a neutral port, says: 
There is on principle no reason for limiting the stay of a belligerent 
ship in a neutral port, provided of course that she receiYes no augmenta-
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tion of force there ; but in the event of a ship belonging to the other bel-
ligerent <lppearing at the snme port, restrictions become necessary in order 
to prevent a collision in neutral waters. 
In 1759 Spain laid down the rule that the first of two vessels of ,\~ar 
belonging to difTerent belligerents to leave one of her ports should not 
be followed by the other until the expiration of b,·enty-four hours. At 
first this rule was only imposed upon prin1teers, the word of a captain 
of a ship of war that he would not commit hostilities being sufficient: but 
it has no"· been extended to all ships of "~ar by most of the great states, 
including Great Britain, France, and the United States. 
The '' t"·enty-four hours rule," as it is called, is not, however, sufficient 
of itself to prevent abuse of neutral ports. In 1861 the United States ship 
Tuscarora took nd,·antage of the rule to prncticall}? blockade the Confed-
erate cnriser Nash rille in Southampton 'Vater. The Tuscarora contrived 
always to start before the N asht·ille, when the latter attempted to sail, 
and returned before the twenty-four hours-during which the .~.Yasht-ille 
had to stay behind-had expired. A similnr case occurred during 1862 
at Gibraltar, where the Confederate ship Sumter was practically blockaded, 
at first by the Tuscarora, and afterwards by the !no and J(earsarge. Xhis 
blockade "~ns terminated by the sale of the Sumter to a British subject, 
and her subsequent escap~ to England. She was ultimately wrecked in 
attempting to run the blockade of Charleston. Accordingly, in 1862 
Great Britain laid down the rule that ,,·ar vessels of either belligerent 
must not remain in British ports for more than twenty-four hours. except 
under stress of weather, or in order to effect necessary repairs, in either 
of which cases the ship must put to sea as soon as possible after the expira-
tion of the t\venty-four hours. 
During the Franco-Prussian "·ar this rule was again adopted by Great 
Britain, and also by the United States, and, taken in conjunction with the 
old "b,·enty-four hours rule," seems likely to be accepted in the future 
for the regulation of the hospitality accorded to belligerent cruisers in 
neutral ports. But it can never be a hard-and-fast nrle of International 
Law, because, as Hall well observes, "the right of the neutral to Yary his 
own port regulations can never be ousted. The rule can never be more 
than one to the enforcement of which a belligerent may trust in the absenct> 
of notice to the contrary." (J. S. Risley, The La,v of \Yar, p. 206.) 
La,vrence gives considerable attention to the subject 
but does not regard the rule as fixed: 
'Ye will consider ne.A-t the duty of belligerent states to obey all reason<lble 
regulations made by neutral states for the protection of their neutrality. 
This duty relates chiefly, though not exclusi,·ely, to maritime afl'airs. 
The land forces of the combatants are not permitted to enter nPutral 
territory, but unless n neutral expressly forbids the entry of belligPrent 
war ships, they may freely enjoy the hospitality of its ports and waters. 
Permission is assumed in the_ absence of any notice to the contrary, but 
nevertheless it is a privilege based upon the consent of the neutrnL and 
therefore capable of being accompanied by any conditions he choo:'e:-:: to 
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impose . Belligerent commanders can demand that they shall not be asked 
to submit to unjust and unreasonable restraints, and that whatever rules 
are made shall be enforced impartially on both sides. But further they 
can not go. 'Yhere they enter on sufi'erance they must respect the wishes 
of those who permit their presence. Only when their vessels arc driven 
by stress of weather, or otherwise reduced to an unseaworthy condition, 
can they demand admission as a matter of strict law. Their right to 
shelter under such circumstances is called the right of asylum, and it 
can not be refused by a neutral without a breach of international duty. 
In recent times neutral states have acted upon their right of imposing 
conditions upon belligerent vessels visiting their ports. The twenty-four 
hour rule is the oldest and the most common. It lays down that when 
war vessels of opposing belligerents are in a neutral ports at the same time, 
or when war vessels of one side and merchant vessels of the other are in 
the like predicament, at least twenty-four hours shall elapse between the 
departure of those who leave first and the departure of their opponents. 
The object of this injunction is to prevent the occurrence of any fighting, 
either in the waters of the neutral or so close to them as to be dangerous 
to vessels frequenting them. Sometimes the word of the commanders 
that they will not commence hostilities in or near neutral territorial waters 
has been accepted as sufficient. Greater precautions were generally taken 
for the restraint of privateers; but the practical abolition of privateering 
by the Declaration of Paris has made obsolete the distinction between two 
classes of belligerent cruisers. The possibility of evading the twenty-four 
hours rule was shown by the conduct of the United States steamer Tus-
carora at Southampton in December, 1861, and January, 1862. The 
southern cruiser Nashville was undergoing repairs in the harbor, and 
by keeping steam up, claiming to precede her whenever she attempted to 
depart, and then returning within a day, the Tuscarora really blockaded 
her in a British port. In the end a British ship of war, exercising a right 
which a neutral possesses in extreme cases, escorted the Nash1.>-ille past the 
Tuscarora and out to sea, while the latter was forbidden to leave the port 
for twenty-four hours. This and other circumstances caused the British 
Government to issue, on January 31, 1862, a series of neutrality regula-
tions more stringent than any hitherto published. They provided that no 
ship of war of either belligerent should be permitted to leave a British port 
from which a ship of war or merchant vessel of the other belligerent had 
previously departed, until after the expiration of at least twenty-four hours 
from the departure of the latter. They laid down further that war vessels 
of either belligerent should be required to depart within twenty-four hours 
of their entry, unless they needed more time for taking in innocent supplies 
or effecting lawful repairs, in which case they were to obtain special permis-
sion to remain for a longer period, and were to put to sea within tw~.:Dty­
four hours after the reason for their remaining ceased. They might freely 
purchase provisions and other things necessary for the subsistence of their 
crew~ but the amount of coal they were allowed to receive was limited to 
as much as was necessary to take them to the nearest port of their country. 
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1\IorcoYcr, no t\YO supplies of coal were to be obtained in British waters 
within three months of each other. These restrictions upon the liberty of 
belligerent Ycsscls in British ports )la\·e been reimposed in subsequent wars. 
The United States adopted them in 1870 at the outbreak of the conflict be-
tween France and Germany, and other powers have copied them wholly or 
in part. In fact, they haYe become so common that they are sometimes 
regarded as rules of International Law. This is especially the case with 
regard to the supply of coal. It is often said that a neutral state is bound 
to allow belligerent cruisers to take on board no more than is sufficient to 
carry them to the nearest port of their own country. Such an obligation 
is unknown to the hnv of nations, which arms neutrality with authority to 
impose \Yhat restraint they deem necessary, but docs not condemn them if 
they impose none. (Lawrence, Principles of International Law, p. 509.) 
}[all regards the t\vcnty-iour rule as ''practically sure 
to be enforced in every \var :'' 
:Marine warfare so far differs from warfare on land that the forces of a 
belligerent may enter neutral territory without being under stress from 
their enemy. Partly as a consequence of the habit of freely admitting 
foreign public ships of war belonging to friendly powers to the ports of a 
state as a matter of courtesy, partly because of the inevitable conditions 
of navigation, it is not the custom to apply the same rigo'r of precaution 
to naYal as to military forces. A vessel of war may enter and stay in a 
neutral harbor without special reasons; she is not disarmed on taking refuge 
after defeat; she may obtain such repair as will enable her to continue her 
voyage in safety; she may take in such provisions as the needs; and if a 
steamer, she may fill up with enough coal to enable her to reach the nearest 
port of her own country; nor is there anything to prevent her from enjoy-
ing the security of neutral waters for so long as may seem good to her. To 
disable a vessel, or to render ner permanently immovable, is to assist her 
enemy; to put her in a condition to undertake offensive operations is to 
aid her country in its war. The principle is obvious; its application is sus-
ceptible of much variation; and in the treatment of ships, as in all other 
matters in which the neutral holds his delicate scale between two belliger-
ents, a tendency toward the enforcement of a harsher rule becomes more 
defined with each successive war. 
It is easy to fix the proper means of repairs; difficulties short of such 
circumstances as those \Vhich haYe already been discussed may sometimes 
occur with reference to supplies of coal or provisions; but if a belligerent 
can leave a port at his will, the neutral territory may become at any time a 
mere trap for an enemy of inferior strength. Accordingly, during a consid-
m·able period, though not very generally or continuously, neutral states 
have taken more or less precaution against the danger of their waters being 
so used. Perhaps the usual custom until lately may be stated as having 
been that the commander of a vessel of war was required to give his word 
not to commit hostilities against any vessel issuing from a neutral shortly 
before him, and that a priYatecr as being less responsible person, was sub-
jected to detention for twenty-four hours. The disfavor howeYer, with 
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which privateers have long been regarded has not infrequently led to their 
entire exclusion, save in cases of danger from the sea or of absolute neces-
sity; and the twenty-four hours rule has been extended to public ships of 
war by Italy, France, England, the United States, and Holland. Probably 
it may now be looked upon as a regulation which is practically sure to be 
enforced in every war. (Hall, International Law, 5th ed., p. 626.) 
I-Iall also points out that the earlier view· of the tw·enty-
four hour rule \vas not sufficient to cover the cases \vhich 
may easily arise, and that a limit to the time of sojourn 
should be made more definite. This position taken by 
Hall is e1nphasized by the differentiation in n1odern \Var 
vessels in respect to speed and sea,vorthiness. 
On the general subject of the t"·~nty-four hour rule 
Hall says: 
It will probably be found necessary to supplement the twenty-four hours 
rule by imposing some limit to the time during which belligerent vessels 
may remain in a neutral port when not actually receiving repairs. The 
insufficiency of the twenty-four hours rule, taken by itself, is illustrated by 
an incident which occurred during the American civil war. In the end of 
1861, the United States cotTette Tuscarora ~rrived in Southampton 
waters with the object, as it ultimately appeared, of preYenting the exit of 
the Confederate cruiser Nashville, which was then in dock. By keeping up 
steam and hav-ing slips on her cable, so that the moment the }{ashville 
moved the Tuscarora could precede her, and claim priority of sailing, by 
mO\ing and returning again within twenty-four hours and by notifying 
and then postponing her own departure, the latter vessel atteml?ted and for 
some time was able to blockade the Nashville within British waters. 
In order to guard against the repetition of such acts, it was ordered in 
the following January that during the continuance of hostilities any 
vessel of war of either belligerent entering an English port "should be 
required to depart and to put to sea within tw·enty-four hours after her 
entrance into such port, except in case of stress of w·eather, or of her requir-
ing provisions or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew, or repairs;" 
in either ofwhich cases the authorities of the port were ordered "to require 
her to put t.o sea as soon as possible after the expiration of such period of 
twenty-four hours." In 1870 [and in 1898] the same rule was laid down; 
and the United States, unwilling to allow t.he others the license which she 
permitted to herself, adopted an identical resolution. It. is perhaps not 
unlikely soon to become general. (Hall, International Law, .5th ed., 
p. 628.) 
v·Vith these opinions continental \Vriters in the 1nain 
concur, son1e asserting it even more strongly than the 
British \vriters cited. 
It is evident that "'"hile the t\venty-four hour rule can 
not be held to be obligatory upon a neutral at the present 
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tiine in the n bsence of the neutral's O\Vll declaration to 
that efi'ect, it is nevertheless in a high degree incu1nbent 
upon a neutral State to enforce the rule. 
The technical correctness of the action of the conl-
nlander in \\·aiting tw·enty-four hours 1nay be ad1nitted, 
provided that it is granted that belligerent vessels nu1y 
seek a neutral port in order to escape capture or defeat 
at th~ hands of the ene1ny. 
Twenty-four hour rule in procla1nations.-The procla-
Inations of neutrality of the various States at the tin1e of 
the Spanish-.. A.1nerican \\Tar sho\v the current of opinion. 
The regulation of Great Britain, \vhich in spirit serves 
as a n1odel to a large nu1nber of others, is as follo\\·s upon 
this point: 
GREAT BRITAIX. 
RuLE 2. If there is now in any such port, roadstead, or waters subject 
to the territorial jurisdiction of the British Crown any ship of war of either 
belligerent, such ship of war shall leave such port, roadstead, or waters 
within such time (not less than twenty-four hours) as shall be reasonable, 
having regard to all the circumstances and the condition of such ship as to 
repairs, provisions, or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew; and 
if after the date hereof any ship of war of either belligerent shall enter any 
such port, roadstead, or waters subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the 
British Crown, such ship shall depart and put to sea within twenty-four 
hours after her entrance into any such port, roadstead, or waters, except in 
case of stress of weather, or of her requiring provisions or things necessary 
for the subsistence of her crew, or repairs, in either of which cases the 
authorities of the port, or of the nearest port (as the case may be), shall 
~equire her to put to sea as soon as possible after the expiration of such 
period of twenty-four hours, without permitting her to take in supplies 
beyond what may be nesessary for her immediate use; and no such vessel 
which may have been allowed to remain within British waters for the 
purpose of repair shall continue in any such port, roadstead, or waters for 
a longer period than twenty-four hours after her necessary repairs shall 
have been completed. Provided, nevertheless, that in all cases in which 
there shall be any vessels (whether ships of war or merchant ships) of both 
the said belligerent parties in the same port, roadstead, or waters within 
the territorial jurisdiction of Her ~fajesty, there shall be an interval of not 
less than twenty-four hours between the departure therefrom of any ~uch 
vessel (whether a ship of war or merchant ship} of the one belligerent, and 
the subsequent departure therefrom of any ship of war of the other bel-
ligerent; and the time hereby limited for the departure of such ships of 
war respectively shall always, in case of necessity, be extended so far as may 
be requisite for giving effect to this proviso, but no further or otherwise. 
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(The same conununication is sent by Lord Lansdo"rne 
to the Lords Co1nn1issioners of the Ad1niralty, etc., 
February 10, 1904.) 
The British regulation 'Yould n1ake it obligatory for a 
belligerent Yessel to ·depart at the end of the t"·enty-
four hour period, unless, on account of necessary repairs, 
provisions, stress of 'Yeather, or presence in port of a ship 
of the 6ther belligerent. 
The colonial regulations are in so1ne instances 1nore 
detailed. 
China in the main follo,Ys Great Britain, though requir-
ing the officials in charge of the port to co1npel the Yessel 
to leave at the expiration of the period. 
CHIN" A. 
(2) After issuance of this proclamation, should any war ship of either 
belligerent come into a Chinese port, except on account of.heaYy winds or 
storms, or to obtain food for crews or for repairs, it must not remain over 
twenty-four hours, and the officials in charge of the port or \Yaterway must, 
at the end of t\venty-four hours, compel said hoat to leave, and must not per-
mit the loading of more provisions than are actually needed by the crew. 
In case of repairs, the ship must leave within twenty-four hours after 
repairs are completed. X o delay must be premitted. \Yar or merchant 
ships, of whicheYer nation, in a Chinese port, must be separated in lea,·ing 
by bYenty-four hours' time, and must not leave before or remain longer 
than said time. 
The procla1na tion of Japan is n1ore general, as is the 
Nether lands proclan1ation and the Dutch ,, ... est Indies 
regulations: 
JAPAX. 
2. K o man-of-war or other ship belonging to one or the other of the 
belligerent po"·ers shall be permitted to commit any act of "-ar or visit, 
search, or capture merchantmen "~thin the territorial waters of the Empire. 
Keither shall such man-of-"·ar or such other ship be allowed to make use 
of any portion of the territorial w·aters of the Empire as the basis or head-
quarters of naval operations or for any warlike purposes whate,·er. 
3. The men-of-war and other ships used for warlike purposes. belonging to 
one or the other of the belligerent powers, may enter any of the ports that 
are open to ships for ordinary purposes of naYigation, but should not stay 
in the \Yaters of such port longer than t"·enty-four hours. In case when 
such men-of-war or such other ships used for warlike purposes ha\e been 
compelled to seek the "·aters of such port on account of unavoidable cir-
cumstances, such as stress of weather, destitution of articles necessary for 
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navigation, or disablement, and are unable to quit the port within twenty-
four hours, they should leave the territorial waters of the Empire as soon 
as such circumstance or circumstances shall have ceased to exist. 
XETHERLAXDS . 
. ARTICLE I. The vessels and ships of war of the parties at war shall be 
admitted to the Kingdom's sea channels, mentioned in article 1 of the 
royal order of February 2, 1893 (Official Gazette, ~o. 46), with due observ-
ance of the further provisions of that order, for a sojourn not exceeding 
twenty-four hours, unless it is absolutely necessary that a longer sojourn 
be granted them, either for the procuring of provender or coal or in case 
of distress or dangers of the sea. · 
DUTCH WEST IXDIES. 
ARTICLE I. Ships and vessels of war of the belligerents will be admitted 
to the harbors and roadsteads of the colony for a stay of twenty-four hours 
at most, unless it is shmvn to be necessary to grant them a longer stay to 
enable them to provide themselves '\\;th provisions or coal, or in cases of 
distress or in dangers of the sea. In such cases, however, they must depart 
as soon as they have finished taking in provisions or coal, within the first 
twenty-four hours, if possible; otherwise, as quickly as practicable, as soon 
as the danger is p'ast, and in the case of repairs within twenty-four hours 
at the furthest after the repairs have been finished. The period of twenty-
four hours at the utmost fixed for the stay in port shall be exceeded only 
when necessary to the execution of the provisions of article 5 of this pub-
lication. Such quantit~y of pro,'isions may be taken on board as is suffi-
cient for the subsistence of the crew, but the supply of coal must not be 
more than sufficient to enable the ship or vessel to reach the nearest port 
of the country to which it belongs or that of one of its allies in the war. 
The same vessel shall not be supplied a second time with coal until at least 
three months have elapsed since the former supply, unless special per-
mission be granted to that effect. 
The Italian regulation is concise and definite. 
ITALY. 
ART. YII. ~o belligerent ship of war or cruiser can remain more than 
twenty-four hours in a port or roadstead, or on the coasts of the Kingdom, 
or in the adjacent waters, even when it comes there alone, except in case 
of arrival under stress on account of bad \Veather, of damages, or want of 
the necessary provisions for the safety of the voyage. 
For Russia a longer delay than t\\Tenty-four hours 
requires special I1nperial authorization. 
RUSSIA. 
The Imperial Government further declares that the ships of war of two 
belligerent po"·ers may only enter Russian ports for twenty-four hours. 
In case of stress of weather, absence of goods or provisions necessary to 
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the maintenance of the crew, or for indispensable repairs, the prolongation 
of the aboYe-mentioned time can only be accorded by special authoriza-
tion of the Imperial GoYernment. 
The proclan1ation of Brazil, one of the fullest in its 
provisions, makes definite reference to the refuge from 
the enemy. 
BRAZIL. 
No war ship or privateer shall be permitted to enter and remain with 
prizes in our ports or bays during more than twenty-four hours, except 
in case of a forced putting into port, and in no manner shall it be permitted 
to it to dispose of its prizes or of articles coming out of them. 
By the 'vords "except in case of a forced putting into port" should also 
be understood that a ship shall not be required to leaYe port within the 
said time: 
First. If it shall not have been able to make the preparations indis-
pensable to enable it to go to sea without risk of being lost. 
Second. If there should be the same risk on account of bad weather. 
Third, and finally, if it shall be menaced by an enemy . 
. In these cases it shall be for the GoYernment, at its discretion, to deter-
mine, in Yiew of the circumstances, the time within which the ship should 
leave. 
Conclusion.-It rnay be said in regard tq the protest 
of the commander that he is in the main justified. in 
rnaking a protest against a sojourn of longer than t'venty-
four hours on the part of the 'var vessel of State X unless 
the sojourn be on the grounds of special necessity and 
not for military reasons. In this position the opinions of 
'vriters and the general drift of neutrality proclan1ations 
agree. 
lntern1nent.-(b) The question next arising is in regard 
to the proper course of action of State Y, a neutral, in 
vie,v of the fact that the belligerent vessels of State x· 
have sought her port to escape the capture by the vessels 
of the United States. 
Land forces thus entering neutral terri tory are in tern eel 
for the remainder of the 'var. Some maintain that the 
same course should be pursued in regard to n1ari time 
forces. · · 
U n1nanned vessel in neutral port.-Tbe completed tor-
pedo boat So1ners belonging to the United States "~as 
not allo,,·ed to leave the British port for rnilitary pur-
poses during the Spanish 'var. The dispatches concern-
ing this boat sho'v that the boat w·as practically interned. 
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Jir. Hay to Jir . Ti'"hite. 
DEPART.:\IEXT OF STATE, 
lVashington, A" orember 19, 1898. 
Sm: In ,·iew of a letter from the Secretary of the :Navy, dated the 15th 
instant , you are instructed to make, if practicable, arrangements with the 
British GO\·ernment permitting the bringing to the United States of the 
torpedo boat Somers, now· stored at Falmouth, Englan,d, gi,·ing assurance 
that in case of the resumption of hostilities w·ith Spain this vessel will not 
be made use of. 
I am, etc., Jonx HAY. 
liir. lVhite to Jir. Hay . 
. A ..:\IERICAX E.:\IBASSY' 
London, December 10, 1898. 
Sm: Referring to your instruction 959, of the 19th ultimo, I ha,·e the 
honor to inform you that upon the day of its receipt I called at the foreign 
office and had an inteiTiew with :\Ir. Assistant Under Secretary \"illiers, 
through whom I requested Her :\Iajesty's Government to allow the torpedo 
bo~t Somers to lea,·e Falmouth, on the understanding that in the e,·ent 
of a rene"·al of hostilities between ourselves and Spain she should not be 
made use of. 
I subsequently addressed a note, of which I inrlose a copy, to the :\Iarquis 
of Salisbury on the subject, and you 'dll observe from his lordship's reply, 
which is also transmitted herewith, that our request has been granted. 
I yesterday communicated this fact to you by a telegram, whereof I 
inclose a copy. 
I have, etc., HEXRY• 'YIIITE. 
III r. lrhite to Lord Salisbury. 
A.:'tiERICAN E.:\IBASSY' 
London, December 1, 1898. 
:\lY Lono: I have the honor, in accordance with instructions from the 
Secretary of State, to invite the good offices of your lordship "·ith a view 
to obtaining the consent of Her :\Iajesty's GO\·ernment to the departure 
from Falmouth, where she has been stored since the outbreak of the war, 
of the Gnited States torpedo boat Somers. 
I am instructed, in making this request, to gi,·e assurance to your lord-
ship, in behalf of my GoYernment, ·that in case hostilities should unfor-
tunately be resumed with Spain, \\·hich would now appear to be highly 
improbable, the Somers will not be made use of, and I venture to hope 
that, upon this understanding, Her ~Iajesty's GO\·ernment may see their 
way to allow her to leave for the United States. 
I have, etc., HEXRY "'"lUTE. 
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Lord Salisbury to ~I r. lVhite. 
FoREIGX OFFICE, December 8, 1898. 
SIR: I ha,·e the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 
1st instant, in which you in,·ite my good offices "·ith a vie''" of obtaining 
the consent of Her :Majesty's Government to the departure from Falmouth, 
where she has been stored since the outbreak of the war, of the United States 
torpedo boat Somers. You add that you are instructed by the United 
States Gm·ernment to gi,·e an assurance that in the event of hostilities 
being resumed with Spain, which \Yould now appear to be highly improb-
able, the Somers will not be made use of. 
In view of this assurance I ha,·e the honor to state that Her ~Iajesty's 
Government are glad to comply with your request, and that the necessary 
instructions will at oace be sent to the proper authorities in order to facili-
tate the departure of the ,·essel. 
I have, etc., F. H. VILLIERs, 
(For the :J[arquis of Salisbury.) 
(United States Foreign Relations, 1898, p. lOOq.) 
.. Asylum to vessels pursued by enenly.-Galiani (Dei 
doveri dei principi neutrali, I, cap. X, §4) maintains that 
asyhnn can be afforded to a ship pursued into neutral 
"'"aters by an ene1ny only on condition that it" practically 
be interned for the remainder of the "·ar. 
Gessner opposes this position of Galiani (Le Droit des 
neutres, p. 78). Perels follo,Ys Gessner, 1nai~taining that 
even in a case ".here en trance to neutral 'Ya ters is for-
bidden to a belligerent ship the position of Galiani is not 
justifiable, because the prohibition ought to hold only 
against voluntary and not against forced entrance. 
(Seerecht, section 39, II, a.) 
Fiore (Droit International, III, p. 476) maintains that 
it seems that there should he a difference made bet"·een 
ships of "·ar of the belligerents "·hich are forcei by the 
elements to n1ake an entrance and those "·hich seek the 
port as a refuge to escape pursuit by a victorious ene1ny 
about to capture or to sink the1n. In the first case, ac-
cording to the usages of in terna 1 ional laW', the neutral 
state ought not to disarn1 the ship nor to prevent it fro1n 
again taking part in the hostilities; but the second case 
is altogether exceptional, since the v·ictor n1ay be de-
prived of his prey through the protection afforded. 1,his 
is "·ithout question an act of luunanity, but if the bel-
ligerent can not continue his attack upon his opponent 
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in territorial "~a ters , he should not be allo"·ed to obtain 
safety nnd after 1naking repairs to return to the co1nbat. 
The refugee "~auld thus obtain the protection of the neu-
tra.lnot only to escape the superior victorious force, but 
a.lso to put hhnself again in condition for battle. Fol-
}o,ving this line of reasoning, Fiore concludes that the 
duties of hun1anity should be reconciled "~ith the exigen-
cies of "~ar by preventing the belligerent ship from taking 
further part in the 'Yar, by retaining it in port, after 
disa.rn1ing, or by allo,Ying it to depart only after obtain-
ing the 'vord of the con1n1ander not to take any part 
during the re1nainder of the w·ar. 
The question of asylun1 to belligerent v~ssels in time 
of "~ar in neutral ports \\'"as fully considered by the Insti-
tute of International Law· in 1898. The report of the 
Institute recognized the difference bet,veen forces upon 
the sea and those upon land, clue to natural conditions, 
'vhich made it i1npossible to obtain supplies, fuel, repairs, 
etc., "·ith the sa1ne facility as upon land, and also recog-
nized the special dangers from- the natural elements, as 
from stress of "'"eather. The Institute in its discussions 
recognized the propriety of achnitting belligerent vessels 
to neutral ports in tin1e of 'var upon such grounds as 
might be regarded broadly as grounds of hun1anity. An 
admission to neutral ports under such conditions, for such 
specific purposes, lin1iting supplies, etc., to those abso-
lutely necessary, and the duration of sojourn to period 
likew .. ise absolutely necessary, " ·ould be no violation of 
neutrality, nor 'vould it make the neutral port a base of 
military operations. It w·as held that such action of the 
neutral 'vas not military in its nature and did not neces-
sarily affect the issue of the conflict or n1odify the rela-
tions of the belligerent. 
On the other hand, the adn1ission to a neutral port of 
a .. belligerent ship pursued by its opponent and unable or 
even un"~illing to 1neet its pursuer is to put the pursued 
ship beyond the reach of the other belligerent even n1ore 
effectively than n1ight have been the case had she entered 
ony of her hon1e ports. Such action 1nay directly influ-
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ence the issue of the w·ar. Yet, in the first place it is 
admittedly impossible for the neutral in every instance to 
prevent the entrance of a vessel thus pursued, and in the 
second place the neutral Inay not allo'v any combat 
'vithin neutral jurisdiction. 
If the neutral allo,vs the belligerent vessel fleeing from 
its opponent to find refuge in its neutral'port for a time 
and then to go forth to meet the enemy, the neutral in 
effect makes the port a base of operations. The fleeing 
belligerent may in many instances 'vithin the t'venty-four 
hour period summon and receive such reenforcement that 
'vhen she again goes forth she may join 'vith other of the 
forces of State X suffi9ient to secure her o'vn safety or to 
threaten the force of the United States. In many other 
'vays the t'venty-four hour sojourn may be a decided or 
even a decisive military advantage. It is evident in this 
situation that the vessel o.f State X entered the port of 
Y from over,vhelming military reasons. The vessel en-
tered to escape capture or destruction by the enemy. 
To afford shelter under such circumstances and to allo'v 
the vessel to again set forth from tlte neutral port upon a 
military expedition is to act as an ally of State X. 
In order that the neutral may not violate neutrality 
and in order that the pursuing belligerent may not be 
deprived of so1ne of the re,vards of his effort to place his 
enemy beyond the po,ver of further contest, there seems 
to be a single Jine of approved conduct, viz, to intern the 
belligerent vessel coming 'vithin neutral jurisdiction in 
order to escape capture by a pursuing ene1ny. 
Kleen, in La Neutralitc, 1898, Volume I, on page 533, 
says: . 
Done, un naivre de guerre juyant devant l'ennemi et refugie .dans un port 
neutre, y est traite ~\l'instar des fuyards de la guerre continentale, c'est-<.\-
dire d(sarme et interne apr0s a voir joui des soins humanitaires; tandis 
qu'au contraire, le naivre entre en disette ou detresse proprement dite peut 
et doit quitter le port et mettre au large aussit6t qu'il est hors de danger. 
Opinion of the Institute of International Law.-I\.Jeen 'vas 
also instrumental in dra,ving up the rules adopted by the 
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Institute of International La'Y 111 1898. These "'"ere 
unanin1ously adopted, as follo\\'"S: 
( Amwaire del' InBfitut de Droit International, £\-l '"II, 1898, Session de la 
llaye, pave 285.) 
Art. 42 La concession d'asile nux belligerants dans les ports neutres, tout 
en dependant de In decision de l'Etat souverain du port et ne pou\ant etre 
exigl>e, est pre::nmu'·e, :.l.moins de notification contmire prealablement com-
muniqul'e. 
Toutefois, qunnt nux mn·ires de guerre, elle doit l'•tre limitee nux cas de 
veritable detresse, par suite de: (1°) Defaite, maladie ou equipage insuffi-
sant, (2°) peril de mer, (3°) manque des moyens d'existence ou de loco-
motion (eau, charbon, vin·es), (4°) besoin de reparation. 
Un IUlYire belligerant se refugiant dans un port neutre devant la poursuite 
de l'ennemi, ou a pres a voir ete defait par lui, ou faute d'equipage pour tenir 
la mer, do it y rester jusqu ':.\ la fin de la guerre. II en est de me me s 'il y 
transporte des malades ou des blesses, et qu'apr~s les avoir debarques, il 
soit en etat de combattre. Les malades et les blesses, tout en etant re<;us 
et secourus, sont, npr~s gtterison, internes egalement, i\ moins d'etre recon-
nus impropres au service militaire. 
Un refuge contre un peril de mer n'est donne aux navires de guerre des 
belligemnts que pour In duree du danger. On ne leur fournit de l'eau, du 
charbon, des ,.i,·res et autres apprm·isionnements analogues qu'en la quan-
tite necessaire pour atteindre le port national le plus proche. Les repara-
tions ne sont permis que dans la mesure necessaire pour que le b:.i.timent 
puisse tenir lamer. Imnu~diatement apr.'>s, le navire doit quitter le port et 
les eaux neutres. 
Si deux navires ennemis sont prets :.\ sortir d'un port neutre simultane-
ment, l'autorite locale etablit, entre leurs appareillage, un inteiTalle suffi-
sant de vingt-quatre heures au moins. Le droit de sortir le premier appar-
tient au m1vire le premier entre, ou, s'il ne veut pas en user, :.\ l'autre, a la 
charge d'en reclamer l'exercice :.\ l'autorite locale, qui lui delivre rautori-
sation si l'adversaire, dument avise, persiste :.\ rester. Si, :I. h1 sortie du 
navire d'un belligerant, un ou plusieurs navires ennemis sont signales, le 
navire sortant doit etre averti et peut Nrc rendmis dans le port pour y 
attendre !'entree ou la disparition des autres. II est defendu d'aller :.\ In 
rencontre d 'un navire ennemi dans le port ou les eaux neutres. 
Les mn·ires des b:·lligerants doivent, en port neutre, se conduire pacifique-
ment, ob2ir nux ordres des autorites, s'abstenir de toutes hostilites, de toute 
prise de renfort et de tout recn1tement militaire, de tout espionnage et de 
tout emploi du port comme base d'operation. 
Les autorites neutres font respecter, au besoin par la force, les prescrip-
tions de cet article. 
L' }~tat neutre peut exiger une indemnite de l' f:tat belligerant dont il a 
entretenu soit des forces legalement internees, soit des malades et blesses, 
OU dont }es IUlYires ont, pas mcgarde OU par infraction <l l'ordre du port, 
occasionne des frais ou dommage. 
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Internment in Russo-Japanese W ar.-On August 10, 
1904, the Ozarevitch, a Russian battle ship, accompanied 
by destroyers, pursued by a Japanese fleet, sought shelter 
in the port of Tsingtau, and the Ger:r;nan authorities 
interned the vessels. Certain other Russian vessels 'vere 
interned at British ports in which they sought shelter. 
The Russian transport Lena received like treatment by 
the United States at San Francisco. 
Oonclusion.-(a) From the point of vie'v of both theory 
and practice it would seem that the United States com-
mander, under the circumstances as stated in the si tua-
tion, 'vould be justified in claiming that belligerent 
vessels entering and remaining in the neutral port in 
order to escape capture by his vessels, should be interned 
for the remaining period of the 'var. 
(b) The authorities of State Y 'vould also be under 
obligations to intern the vessels of State X thus seeking 
neutral protection. · 
